1 See also Glass (1927) , Macauley (1938) , Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , Canova (1986) and Barro (1987) .
2 Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) , using a switching regression technique, narrow the likely date of the change in the stochastic process of the nominal rate to the interval between December 1914 and March 1915. They also show that the behavior of the term structure at the short end of the yield curve changed more or less concurrently in a way consistent with the qualitative predictions of the expectations theory of the term structure.
worldwide gold standard at the start of World War I. A Serious examination of these competing hypotheses is the goal of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we provide soime historical background, placing the institutional developments -the founding of the Fed, possible interactions between the various central banks, war, suspensions and resumptions of specie payments -in perspective. In Section III we characterize the stochastic behavior of nominal interest Tates and inflation rates before and after 1914 for the United States and Britain. We obtain a sharp characterization of the change in the nominal rate processes: an almost complete disappearance of forecastable variation, including seasonality, in nominal rates for both countries. We also find some indication of change in the inflation process: the emergence of positive serial correlation where inflation had previously been closer to white noise.
Section IV of the paper considers the a priori plausibility of the hypothesis that the founding of the Fed was an important factor in stabilizing interest rates after 1914, given the relatively modest size of the United States in international trade and finance. We propose that policy interaction in a many country game might provide the missing link. We present an example in which interest rate stabilization, though desired by each central bank, occurs oily if all countries have central banks.
In our example this follows because countries pursuing interest rate stabilization alone experience undesirable gold flows. The model suggests that the founding of the Fed might have been important because it marked the beginning of a new era in which all major countries had a central bank.
Section V presents a number of pieces of evidence bearing on role of the Fed versus the role of the gold standard in contributing to the changes in the stochastic behavior of interest rates and prices. 4 We first examine the switch from fixed to flexible rates 'at the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. We find that it was not accompanied by the same kinds of changes in interest rate 4 We also discuss briefly the hypothesis that World War I per se wa~s responsible for the change in regime.
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behavior that occured in 1914, which casts doubt on the destruction of the gold standard as the principal cause of the change in the stochastic processes for interest rates in 1914. Our second piece of evidence comes from examining the correlations across countries of both interest rates and price levels. We find that the changes in these correlations after 1914 were modest at best, and they do not appear to move in the direction implied by a simple shift from fixed to flexible rates. This evidence therefore also suggests that the introduction of the Fed was an important factor in the 1914 change in regime.
In Section VI we present a rather qualified evaluation of the likelihood that the stabilization of the nominal interest process was unaccompanied by an alteration of the real rate process, an assumption of the theory of interest rate targeting in Barro (1987) . In particular, we examine whether the smoothing of the seasonal in nominal rates in the second regime reflected a smoothing of the seasonal in real rates. We wish to evaluate Shiller's (1980) suggestion that the seasonality that was removed from the nominal rate may have reappeared in prices and thus was not purged from the real rate. We use a different interest rates series, different statistical techniques, as well as data for an additional country to address this question. Unfortunately, the data exhibit less power to judge this issue than we had hoped. The volatitility of inflation during both subperiods leads to the finding of very large standard errors for the estimated seasonal pattern in real rates, so we confirm Shiller's conclusion that "we can't say with any confidence whether a policy of eliminating the seasonal pattern in nominal rates reduced the seasonal pattern in real rates."
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. Historical Overview
The period from 1879 to 1914 stands out in the history of world monetary systems as the time when the world came closest to operating on a textbook version of the gold standard. The period is also unusual, although not unique, in that the United States was the only major economic power that did not possess a central bank. The period after 1914 differed drastically from the period before 1914 in several respects. As a result of World War I, the international gold standard was suspended in most countries, and it returned for only a limited time and in much weakened form. Andrew (1907) and Timberlake (1963 Timberlake ( ,1978 . On the New York Clearing House, see Timberlake (1984) .
likelihood that one or both of these institutional changes caused the changes in finanical markets that occurred at the same time. In this section we review the major historical events connected with the changes in institutions.
A. Central Banking Before 1914
By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, most of the important economic powers other than the United States had established central banks. (Eichengreen (1985) , p.13).
Contemporary discussions about how the Bank of England should set Bank Rate indicate the objectives that pre-1914 central banks pursued when they were not handcuffed by the need to insure convertibility. Sayers (1936) 
B. The Gold Standard and World War I
The exact defintion of the gold standard varies considerably among different authors, and the features of such a standard that are important depend on the question at hand. Our discussion here focusses on those features of a gold standard that are crucial to determining the conditions under which interest rates and prices are determined both within and across countries. Eichengreen (1985) ascribes three basic characteristics to a classical gold standard: 1) convertibility between domestic money and gold at a fixed official price; 2) freedom for private citizens to export and import gold; and 3) a set of rules relating the quantity of money in circulation to that country's gold stock. 8 The first two features imply that a gold standard establishes a system of fixed exchange rates between national currencies. This places strong restrictions on the feasible monetary and fiscal policies available to any open economy operating under a gold standard (Sargent (1986), pp.45-46) .
Three different types of rules relating the quantity of fiat money to gold reserves were common (Bloomfield (1959) , p.18). Fiduciary systems required all notes above a certain limit to be backed 100 per cent by legal reserves. Proportional systems required notes to be covered by a minimum proportion of legal reserves. Combination systems involved aspects of both systems. If a central bank (in a closed economy) operated under a fiduciary system and was not at the constraint, then it could affect interest rates and the price level by altering the mix of notes relative to gold.
As mentioned above, the thirty-five year period preceding 1914 constituted the world's most direct experience with a classical gold standard. All the major economic powers in Europe and Asia, as well as the United States and most Latin American countries, maintained convertibility during this period. There were only a few devaluations by countries operating on the gold standard, and only a small number of economic powers participated in any other kind of monetary arrangement.
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The period is also noteworthy for the comparative absence of balance of payments crises or other traumatic events associated with the exchange rate regime.
The suspension of the gold standard in 1914 was the direct result of the outbreak of World War I in August, 1914 . Within a few months of the outbreak of war (indeed in some cases even before the formal declaration), most countries had suspended gold payments either de jure or de facto (Brown (1940), pp.7-26 ). When the war ended, most countries had experienced such rapid inflation during the previous four years that an immediate return to convertilibity at anything like the pre-war parities was unthinkable. It was the announced aim of virtually all countries, however, to return to the gold standard quickly, and a great deal of macroeconomic history of the subsequent period can only be understood in this light.
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The correct characterization of the system of international monetary arrangements varies considerably over the 1914-1933 period. During the War the major currencies floated relative to one another, but there were sufficient controls on prices, gold movements, and international capital sSee also the papers in Bordo and Schwartz (1984) for detailed discussions of the features of a goldl standard.
9 China, El Salvador, and Honduras maintained silver standards during this period (Eichengreen (1985) , p.6).
10 See, for example the First Interim Report of the Cunliffe Committee (1918) in Britain. Keynes (1923) was an outspoken opponent of the return to gold. 
III. Evidence of the Changes in the Behavior of Interest Rates and Prices
In this section we document the changes in the behavior of nominal interest rates and inflation rates that occurred after 1914. We present results for two countries, the United States and Britain.
These two countries, at least as of the second period, were the world's major economic powers, and New York and London were its key financial centers. In addition, there are consistent data series for these two countries. To the extent that there are data for other countries, they confirm the main results presented below.
We examine the behavior of financial markets in both countries for two periods (1890-1910 and 1920-1933) 12 Our results are essentially unchanged if we omit the years 1929-1933 from the second sample period.
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The series is described more fully in Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987 is (purportedly) measured during the last week of each month. We have shifted this series forward one month in all of the calculations reported below, so it is only one week out of alignment with our interest rate series. In Table 2 we show regressions of the short rate on its own lagged values, including and excluding seasonal dummies. These results confirm those in Table 1 . In the early period, the coefficient on the lagged short rate is significantly less than one in both countries, and there is quantitatively important evidence of seasonality. In the later period, the coefficient on the lagged short rate is not significantly different from one and there is much less evidence of seasonality. In both countries, the short-term nominal interest rate became approximately a random walk.
In Figures 1 and 2 we display estimates of the seasonal pattern in short rates for both countries and sample periods. The seasonal patterns were calculated by regressing the short rate on seasonal dummies only, with the coefficients constrained to change smoothly from one month to the next. 16 The hypothesis tests were carried out on the seasonal dummy coefficients in the change in the short rate because the level is probaibly non-stationary in the second sample period. The tests were performed on the OLS estimates of seasonal dummy coefficients, with the standard errors corrected using the Hansen and liodrick (1980) procedure (as modified by Newey and West (1987) ). The lag length used to calculate the variancecovariance matrix was 12.
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The next question we address is whether the changes in the behavior of nominal interest rates coincide with changes in the behavior of inflation rates. Tables 3 and 4 present results for the one month inflation rate analogous to those in Tables 1 and 2 for the nominal interest rate.
During the early sample period, the autocorrelation function in the United States shows significant correlation at the first lag but little at any other lag. This is exactly the result we would expect if the true inflation process were white noise in continuous time but we employed time averaged price level data to compute the inflation rates (Working (1960) ). For the United States the price level data are averages over a month, so our results are consistent with a white noise process for the inflation rate. In Britain, there is stronger first order autocorrelation during the early sample period, and several of the higher order autocorrelations are significant. Also, the price data for Britain are allegedly from the last week of each month, so the time-average bias should not be severe. The results therefore indicate some positive serial correlation in the inflation rate for Britain. In the post-1914 sample period there is modest but clearly significant persistence in the inflation rate in both countries.
The regression results tell essentially the same story as the autocorrelations. In the United
States there is little indication of persistence in the inflation rate in the early sample period but clear evidence of such persistence in the later sample. In Britain, there is some indication of persistence in the first sample and modest but significant persistence in the later sample.
We display estimates of the seasonal patterns in inflation rates in Figures 3 and 4.17 The estimates indicate substantial seasonality in the inflation rate in both countries in both time periods:
the amplitude of the seasonal is at least 800 basis points in every sample and more than 2000 basis points in the later samples. The seasonal in the inflation rate is significantly different from zero in all four samples. Although the point estimates suggest that there are significant differences in the seasonal patterns across sample periods, tests of the hypothesis of no change fail to reject the null at even the 35% level for either country.
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The results presented above clearly delineate the change in the stochastic processes for interest rates and prices. In both countries there is increased persistence in both the short term nominal interest rate and the inflation rate, and there is markedly decreased seasonality in the nominal rate.
One cannot determine whether there are significant changes in the seasonal patterns in inflation 17 These were calculated by regressing the inflation rates on seasonal dummies whose coefficients were constained to follow a fifth order polynomial, as above.
The test statistics refer to OLS estimates of the seasonal dummy coefficients, with standard errors computed using the Hansen and Hodrick (1980) procedure.
rates. Although the changes that occur in both variables are qualitatively similar across countries, the changes are more pronounced in the United States.
IV. A Model of Policy Interaction Under a Gold Standard
The traditional explanation of the changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices in the United States is that the changes were due to the founding of the Federal Reserve System. Certainly a reader of contemporary periodicals would be drawn to this explanation. As we have discussed, the Fed was created primarily to stabilize interest rates and credit markets, so it should not be surprising that interest rates stabilized after its founding. The fact that the change in the behavior of interest rates and prices occurred worldwide, however, calls this traditional explanation into question. One might also make the a priori argument that under a fixed exchange rate system, as existed before 1914, the existence of the Fed should be irrelevant. Under fixed exchanges rates, international arbitrage should equate nominal interest rates throughout the world. Therefore, the introduction of a single central bank, such as the Federal Reserve, should have at most minimal effects on interest rates or prices.
The assertion that the Fed could not have been responsible for the changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices obviously raises the question of what did cause these changes. The most obvious alternative explanation is that the change were caused by the breakdown of the classical gold standard and the fixed exchange rate system at the beginning of World War I. Indeed, it might seem difficult to make an affirmative case for the position that the breakdown of the classical gold standard was not relevent to the changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices.
The purpose of this section is to make theoretically plausible the position that the Fed could have been the cause of the changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices. We consider a historical counterfactual. In particular, we argue that the founding of the Fed might have led to the changed behavior of interest rates and prices, even if World War I and the breakdown of the classical gold standard had not occurred. Of course, no purely theoretical discussion can preclude a possibly important role for the destruction of the gold standard in causing the changes in finanical markets. Theory can, however, overturn the presumption that the changes could not have been due to the Fed. We turn in Section V to an evaluation of the part played by each of these two events in bringing about the observed changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices.
A. The Set-Up of the Model
We propose a simple model in which exchange rates are fixed and in which the introduction In each country, the demand for money is given by the simple quantity equation:
where M is the country's quantity of money, P is the price of goods in terms of money, and a star denotes a foreign country variable. Because we assume purchasing power parity, P = P*.
The supply of money is assumed to consist of monetary gold and fiduciary money-that is, money printed by the central bank that is (in principle) convertible into gold and thus trades one-for-one with gold. The world supply of money is Mt + Mt* = Mt-1
where X is the quantity of new fiduciary money printed. We assume that the bank changes the quantity of fiduciary money within sufficiently narrow bounds that the maintenance of the gold standard is not threatened.
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There is an exogenous real interest rate, rt, that is common across countries. where ire is the world inflation rate. From the simple money demand equations, we know
The rate of inflation equals the rate of money growth in each country.
The central banks have two objectives: to achieve a nominal interest rate target and to avoid flows of gold between countries. Define 
Mt-1+Xt-Mt

B. The Solution with One Central Bank
Consider first the situation in which only the home country has a central bank. In this case, z*= 0. The home country has one choice variable, x, which affects both the interest rate i and the amount of gold flow f. central banks, within the context of a continuing gold standard. We concluded that interest rate stabilization in each country would have been an admissible equilibrium outcome in that scenario.
Suppose the objective of the central bank is to minimize
22 With an arbitrary nominal interest peg, it, the implied inflation rate rnay not be cornpatible with the long run maintenance of the gold standard. The time subscript indicates that the central bank periodically revises its interest rate target with this consideration in mind. Even though the bank cannot set the long run nominal rate arbitrarily, however, it can still offset seasonal and other transitory disturbances.
A second counterfactual worth entertaining is to suppose that the gold standard had been suspended, but no Federal Reserve had been established. Although the freedom from international constraints regarding gold flows would certainly have been achieved, it is by no means clear how, in the absence of a central bank, the United States could have taken advantage of this freedom to stabilize interest rates. We are not aware of a well-articulated story in which the dissolution of a gold standard, in and of itself, would lead to smoothed interest rates. This observation makes us suspicious that the break with gold, unaccompanied by the introduction of the Fed, would have done-the job. However, some more concrete evidence on the roles of the two historical events is needed. In this section we present information that allows us to evaluate whether the Fed or the destruction of the gold standard was more likely responsible for the changes in financial markets.
Before turning to that evidence, we address briefly the issue of whether World War I per se, or some other unspecificed event, might have been responsible for the changes in the behavior of interest rates and prices. We note first that the changes we have documented above appear to have occurred well before 1920. When we compute results for the period 1915-1918, we find that this period appears qualitatively much more like the 1920-1933 period than like the 1890-1910
period. The changes that occurred in financial markets were clearly present during World War I and continued, in even more dramatic form, after the end of the War. This indicates that the War in and of itself was not the source of the changes. As a second piece of evidence that either the Fed or the gold standard was responsible for the changes, we have examined the switching regressions analogous to those in Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987) that allow us to date the most likely point of the changes in the stochastic processes. We find that for both interest rates and inflation the switch occured with high probability sometime between the middle of 1914 and the middle of 1915 in both the United States and Britain. Thus, the results support the notion that either the dismantling of the gold standard or the founding of the Fed, rather than some other unspecified event, was responsible for the changes observed in the stochastic behavior of interest rates and prices. We now turn to evaluating the roles of the two major changes in institutions. Our first piece of evidence comes from examining a different historical example of a switch from fixed to flexible exchange rates. Tables 5 and 6 present autocorrelations of the short rate and the inflation rate for the sample periods 1957-1969 and 1974-1984 . The first sample period ends before the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed rate regime while the second begins after intitiation of the current flexible rate period.
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The results allow us to make two points. First, seasonal or other transitory variation in interest rates did not return in either country when the world returned to a system of fixed exchange rates. The 1957-69 period exhibits essentially none of the mean reverting variation in interest rates displayed by the 1890-1910 period. Second, the change from fixed to flexible rates in the early 1970's was accompanied by at most minor changes in the persistence of interest rates in each of the two countries. 25 If the exchange rate regime rather than the Fed was the key consideration in 1914,
we would expect to see some signs of similar changes in the interest rate process accompanying the inception and demise of the Bretton Woods regime
The evidence on inflation shows that the degree of persistence during the Bretton Woods period is more like the pre-Fed period than the 1920-33 period. Also, the increased persistence of inflation at the demise of Bretton Woods mimics the increased persistence after 1914 and is thus more suggestive of the importance of the exchange rate regime than is the evidence from interest rates. It is worth noting that for both the 1957- 1969 and 1974-1984 periods the autcorrelations in the WPI inflation rate reported here are noticeably lower than those using the CPI inflation rate (Barsky (1987) ).
The second and perhaps more important piece of evidence on the relative role of the Fed and the exchange rate regime appears in Tables 7 and 8 , which show the correlations across countries in price levels, inflation rates, the level of interest rates, and changes in interest rates for the pre-1914 and post-1914 sample periods. To a first approximation, there is little change in these cross-country correlations across sample periods. If anything, inflation rates show more correlation across countries in the flexible rate period, contrary to the usual expectation based on purchasing power parity considerations.
If we ask what contribution the suspension of a gold standard could have made to interest rate stabilization, it appears that any answer must involve a freeing of domestic interest rates and price levels from the international constraints posed by fixed exchange rates. Yet the breakdown of the gold standard in 1914 was not accompanied by an observed change in the international linkages of prices and interest rates. Of course, these cross-country correlations are properties of reduced form 24 The data series that we use for these calculations are monthly observations on the three month United States and British Treasury bill rates (both taken from the first week of each month) and monthly observations on the United States and British WPI's. We begin the early sample period in 1957 because that is when WPI data for Britain are first available.
25 There are clear increases in the volatility of the change in interest rates, in contrast to the results for 1914. relationships, and it is possible that two very different structures could have lead to similar reduced form observations. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the data to suggest that the within-country changes in prices and interest rates were the result of any reduction in international linkages of interest rates and prices associated with the switch in the exchange rate regime.
In Tables 9 and 10 we present the correlations across countries for the Bretton Woods and recent flexible exchange rate periods. There is no evidence that the change in exchange rate regime coincided with a change in the extent to which interest rates and prices move together, confirming the results in . This surprising finding warrants investigation in future work.
VI. The Behavior of Real Interest Rates Before and After 1914
Any discussion of interest rate stabilization would be incomplete without asking whether the stabilization of the nominal rate was accompanied by a change in the process followed by real rates. We take up this question now. We focus on the seasonal movements in real rates because seasonality is an identifiable source of predictable variation in the nominal rate prior to 1914 that is clearly absent in the second sample period. As noted by Shiller (1980) , the question thus becomes whether the disappearance of the seasonal in nominal rates was offset by a change in the inflation seasonal so that the seasonal pattern of the underlying expected real rate remained invariant.
We follow the procedure of regressing ex post real rates on twelve dummies for the periods 1980 -1910 and 1920 -1933 .26 As Mishkin (1981 shows, this procedure provides consistent estimates of the seasonal in the ex ante real rate. Since unanticipated inflation adds noise, however, this seasonal pattern will be estimated less precisely than if we had direct measures of the expected real rate. There is a significant real rate seasonal at the 10% (but not the 5%) level for both countries in the earlier period. The later periods shows no statistically significant evidence of a real rate seasonal in either country, suggesting that there might have been a significant change in the seasonal in the real rate process. Tests of the hypothesis of no change, however, do not reject the null at any conventional significance level. We are forced to conclude, along with Shiller (1980) , that the data do not allow any convincing inference about the change in the behavior of real rates.
Our results do make the conclusion stated in Shiller (1980) 1890-1910 1920-1933 1890-1910 1920-1933 1957-1969 1974-1984 1957-1969 1974-1984 1957-1969 1974-1984 1957-1969 1974-1984 
